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Abstract
Fairness in algorithmic decision-making processes is attracting increas-
ing concern. When an algorithm is applied to human-related decision-
making an estimator solely optimizing its predictive power can learn biases
on the existing data, which motivates us the notion of fairness in machine
learning. while several different notions are studied in the literature, little
studies are done on how these notions affect the individuals. We demon-
strate such a comparison between several policies induced by well-known
fairness criteria, including the color-blind (CB), the demographic parity
(DP), and the equalized odds (EO). We show that the EO is the only
criterion among them that removes group-level disparity. Empirical studies
on the social welfare and disparity of these policies are conducted.
1 Introduction
The goal of the supervised learning is to estimate label y by learning an esti-
mator yˆ(X) as a function of associated feature X. Arguably, an estimator of
better predictive power is preferred, and standard supervised learning algorithm
learns yˆ(X) from existing data. However, when it is applied to human-related
decision-making, such as employment, college admission, and credit, an estimator
optimizing its predictive power can learn biases on the existing data. To address
this issue, fairness-aware machine learning proposes methodologies that yield
predictors that not only have better predictive power but also complies with
some notion of non-discrimination.
Let s be the (categorical) sensitive attribute among X that represent the
applicants’ identity (e.g., gender or race). Group level fairness concerns the
inequality among groups of different s. A naive approach, which we call color-
blind [1], is to remove s from X in predicting yˆ: Although such an approach
avoids direct discrimination through s, the correlation between s and the other
attributes inX causes indirect discrimination, which is referred to as the disparate
impact. Another notion of fairness, which is widely studied (e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5]),
is demographic parity (DP). DP requires the independence of s from yˆ. For
instance, a university admission comply with DP if each group has equal access
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to the university. The demographic parity is justified in the legal context in
labor market: The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [6] clarified
the so-called 80%-rule, that prohibits employment decisions of non-negligible
inequality. In spite of such legal background, some concerns on DP are raised.
Hardt et al. [7] argued that DP is incompatible with the perfect classifier yˆ = y,
and thus it is not appropriate when the true label y is reliable. To address this
issue, they provided an alternative notion of fairness called the equalized odds
(EO), which requires the independence of s from yˆ conditioned on y and thus
allows yˆ = y. Note that essentially the same notion is also proposed in Zafar et
al. [8], and the notion of the counterfactual fairness [9] is similar to EO given a
specific causal modeling. Note that DP and EO are mutually incompatible [10].
Despite massive interest in the fairness in machine learning, only a few of
them concerned on the resulting social impact of a policy based on the proposed
notion of fairness produces. The result of a policy is far from straightforward:
In some case, an introduction of a naive notion of fairness can be harmful: For
example, consider the case of a university admission policy. If the admission office
discriminates blacks by believing they are less likely to perform well academically
and lowers their admission standard for them to propel affirmative action, blacks
may be discouraged to invest in their education because they pass the admission
regardless of their effort. As a result, blacks may end up being less proficient and
the negative stereotype “self-perpetuates”. Indeed, self-fulfillment of stereotype
is an empirically documented phenomenon in some fields [11].The difficulty of
analyzing this phenomenon lies in the interaction between the policy-maker and
the applicants: when a policy changes, the applicants also change their behavior
due to a modified incentive.
This lack of interest in the social outcome, in turn, results in the absence of
a unified measure to compare different fairness criteria. In this regard, economic
theory offers useful tools. In particular, literature in labor economics has a long
history of analysis of welfare implication of policy changes. That is, economists
investigate how the players’ welfare, or aggregate level of their utility, changes
by imposing a policy.
By combining the theoretical framework developed in labor economics with
the “oblivious” post-processing non-discriminatory machine learning [7], we
propose a framework of comparison between different fairness notions in view
of the incentives. We demonstrate such a comparison between several policies
induced by well-known fairness criteria; color-blind (CB), demographic parity
(DP), and equalized odds (EO). As a result, we show that while CB and DP
sometimes disproportionately discourage unfavored groups from investing in the
improvement of their value, EO equally incentivizes the two groups.
Importantly, our framework is not just theoretical but applicable to practices
and enables to assess the fairness notions based on the actual situation. To
demonstrate this point, we compare the fairness policies by using a real-world
dataset: We show that (i) Unlike CB and DP, EO is disparity-free. Moreover,
(ii) all of the CB, DP, and the EO tend to reduce social welfare compared to no
fairness intervention case. Among them, EO yielded the lowest social welfare:
One can view this as a cost of removing disparity.
2
1.1 Related work
A long line of works on discrimination and affirmative action policy exists in
the literature of labor economics([12];[13];see Fang and Moro [14] for a survey of
recent theoretical frameworks). Coate and Loury [1] considered a simple model
where an employer infers applicants’ productivity based on one-dimensional
signal, which contains information about their invested effort in skill. This
nominal paper argues that even under the affirmative action policy to enforce the
employer to set the same rate of hiring to all the groups, there still exist equilibria
where one group is negatively stereotyped, and consequently, discouraged from
investing in skills.
The problem of those analyses in economics is that their setting is abstract
and simplified so that they do not allow us real-world applications with actual
datasets. For instance, based on their simple model, Coate and Loury [1] states
that “The simplest intervention would insist that employers make color-blind
assignments” and it would ensure the fairness as well as the same incentives across
groups. However, it is commonly perceived in machine learning that color-blind
policy does not ensure fairness due to disparate impact [15, 16, 17]. Due to
a lack of consideration on such learning-from-data process and related issues,
frameworks proposed in economics are not designed for the real-world application.
This paper modifies their models to be applicable to machine learning problems.
More importantly, their main interest lies in affirmative action: While affirmative
action that imposes a restriction on the outcome such as the ratio of admitted
students (which is similar to demographic parity) is arguably important, modern
machine learning algorithms propose various methodologies to ensure the fairness
at the prediction level, not the outcome level.
A few papers in machine learning considered a game-theoretic view of decision-
making processes and thus enable us to compare fairness criteria. In particular,
the closest papers to ours are [18, 19]. Hu and Chen [18] considered a two-
stage process and each stage dealt with group-level and individual-level fairness,
whereas we are focusing on comparing the several notions of group-level fairness.
Liu et al. [19] compared several notions of fairness including the demographic
parity and the equalized opportunity in terms of its long-term improvements
and characterized the conditions where each of these fairness-related constraints
works. Unlike ours, the analysis in Liu et al. [19] assumes the availability of
the function that determines how the delayed impact from the prediction arises.
Identification of such a function requires us counter-factual experiments or model-
dependent analyses. Moreover, they evaluate the fairness criteria by the disparity
between groups, without analyzing the social welfare. By assuming a model
with micro-foundation of players’ decision-making, we are able to compare the
welfare implication of different fairness criteria.
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Figure 1: Sequence of timings.
2 Model
We consider a game between a continuum of applicants and a single firm. The
game models application processes, such as university admissions, job applica-
tions, and credit card applications. A firm has a dataset on the performance
of applicants and uses it to estimate the performance of the future applicants.
For the ease of discussion, we assume that there exist two groups: Applicant of
each group is assigned a sensitive attribute s ∈ {0, 1}. Let λ1 be the fraction
of the applicants of s = 1, and λ0 be 1 − λ1. Each of the applicants has an
option to exert his or her effort, and before determining whether or not to exert
the effort, the applicant is given a cost c ∈ [c, c¯] of that. Let e ∈ {q, u} be the
variable that indicates the effort of an applicant. The applicant’s feature X ∈ X
is drawn from a distribution.The effort is very relevant to the performance of
the applicant, and thus the firm would like to admit all the applicants of e = q
(that we call the qualified applicants) and to dismiss the applicants of e = u
(that we call the unqualified applicants). If a qualified applicant is accepted, the
firm earns revenue vq > 0. If an unqualified applicant is accepted, the firm loses
−vu < 0 (= negative revenue). All the applicants prefer to be accepted, and let
ω be the revenue of the applicant to be accepted. The firm uses the pre-trained
classifier that estimates the effort e of the applicant from the sensitive attribute
s and non-sensitive attributes X. Following [7], we assume that the classifier is a
function X → R, where θ(X) ∈ R indicates how likely the applicant is qualified.
Let fe,s(θ) and Fe,s(θ) be the density and distribution of θ = θ(X) given e and s.
Let Gs(c) be the distribution of the cost c given s. For the ease of discussion, we
assume Gs(c) be a uniform distribution over [c, c¯]. Figure 1 displays the timing
of the interaction between the applicants and the firm. We pose the following
assumption on the signal θ of the classifier.
Assumption 1 Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP): fq,s(θ)fu,s(θ) is strictly
increasing in θ for s = {0, 1}.
Namely, Assumption 1 states that the applicant of a larger θ is more likely to be
qualified.
In the sequel, we discuss rational behavior of the firm (Section 2.1) and the
applicants (Section 2.2).
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2.1 Firm’s behavior
The MLRP (Assumption 1) motivates the firm to make a threshold of θ on
the hiring decision. A rational firm, without fairness-related restriction, would
optimize its revenue, and the optimal threshold of θ depends on the firm’s belief
on the fraction of the qualified applicants: Let pis be the fraction of the qualified
applicants given s.
When the firm observes (θ, s), the probability of this applicant being qualified
is
P(e = q|θ, s) = pisfq,s(θ)
pisfq,s(θ) + (1− pis)fu,s(θ)
The firm accepts this applicant iff P(e = q|θ, s)vq + (1 − P(e = q|θ, s))vu ≥ 0.
Given the MLRP assumption, this is equivalent to set a threshold θ˜s such that
vq
vu
=
1− pis
pis
fu,s(θ˜s)
fq,s(θ˜s)
(1)
Letting r = vq/vu and φs = fu,s(θ˜s)/fq,s(θ˜s), (1) is equivalent to
pis =
φs(θ˜s)
r + φs(θ˜s)
, (2)
and the applicants with θ > θ˜s is approved.
2.2 Applicants’ behavior
Let c˜s(θ) = ω[Fu,s(θ)− Fq,s(θ)] be the expected increase of reward by exerting
an effort. Given the firm’s threshold θ˜s, c˜s(θ˜s) is the incentive of the applicant
to exert an effort. A rational applicant invests in skills iff his or her cost c is
smaller than c˜s(θ˜s) : which implies
pis = G(c˜s(θ˜s)) := min
(
1,
c˜s(θ˜s)− c
c¯− c
)
. (3)
2.3 Laissez-faire Equilibria
Section 2.1 (resp. 2.2) introduced the best response of the firm (resp. the
applicants) to the belief in response to the action of the applicants (resp. the
firm). When no fairness-related constraint is posed, a firm that fully exploits s
(that we call “Laissez-faire”, LF) will set different threshold θ˜s for each s. If the
fraction of the qualified people and the threshold of hiring are exactly the two
rate postulated by the beliefs, then the players on both sides cannot increase
their revenue by deviating from the current actions: Namely, in the equilibrium
pis = G(c˜s(θ˜s)) holds:
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Figure 2: Illustration of the equilibrium parameters (θ˜s, pis). Assumption 1
implies that the FR curve is strictly decreasing, and the AR curve is unimodal.
The value θˆ = [θ : (dG(c˜(θ)))/(dθ) = 0] is the mode of the AR curve.
Definition 1 (Laissez-Faire Equilibrium [1]) An equilibrium is a quadraple
(θ˜0, θ˜1, pi0, pi1) satisfying Equality 2 for s = 0, 1 and pi0 = G(c˜0(θ˜0)), pi1 =
G(c˜1(θ˜1)).
Figure 2 illustrates the beliefs pis on equilibria, which is the intersections of the
following two curves. Namely, (i) the Firm-Response (FR) curve: {(θ˜s, pis) :
pis =
φs(θ˜s)
r+φs(θ˜s)
} that indicates the threshold that maximizes the firm’s revenue
and (ii) the Applicant-Response (AR) curve: {(θ˜s, pis) : pis = G(c˜s(θ˜s))} that
indicates the incentive of the applicants. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 (Existence of multiple equilibria, Proposition 1 in Coate and
Loury [1]) For each s, there exist two or more intersections of the FR and AR
curves if and only if there exists θ˜s such that G(c˜s(θ˜s)) >
φs(θ˜s)
r+φs(θ˜s)
.
The proof directly follows from the monotonicity of FR and the unimodality of
AR. As discussed by Coate and Loury [1], the existence of multiple intersections
implies the existence of asymmetric equilibria where pi0 < pi1, even in the case
signal is not biased (i.e., Fe,s=0(θ) = Fe,s=1(θ)). Such an asymmetric equilibrium
discourages the unfavored group s = 0 as θ0 < θ1 implies the reduced incentive
of the unfavored group.
2.4 Social Welfare
In accordance with Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we define the social welfare as follows:
The firm’s welfare is
FWs = FWs(θ, pi) = (pis(1− Fq,s(θ))vq − (1− pis)(1− Fu,s(θ))vu) ,
whereas the applicants’ welfare is
AWs = AWs(θ, pi) = ω
(
pi (1− Fq,s(θ)) + (1− pi) (1− Fu,s(θ))
)
+
∫ (1−pi)c+pic¯
c
cdc.
The social welfare is the sum of the two quantities above summed over the
groups: Let SWs = FWs + AWs. The quantity SW =
∑
s λsSWs(θ˜s, pis) is the
social welfare per applicant.
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Theorem 1 (Equilibrium of the maximum social welfare) Fix s ∈ {0, 1}. For
group s, let there be two equilibria (θ˜(1)s , pi
(1)
s ), (θ˜
(2)
s , pi
(2)
s ) such that pi
(1)
s > pi
(2)
s .
Let SW(1)s ,SW
(2)
s the corresponding social welfares. Then, SW
(1)
s > SW
(2)
s .
Proof 1 Note that, the fact that (θ˜(i)s , pi
(i)
s ) for i ∈ {1, 2} are at equilibrium
implies that
SW(i)s := FWs(θ˜
(i)
s , pi
(i)
s )+AWs(θ˜
(i)
s , pi
(i)
s ) = max
θ
FWs(θ, pi
(i)
s )+max
pi
AWs(θ˜
(i)
s , pi).
(4)
, and thus
SW(1)s − SW(2)s ≥ min
θ
(
(FWs(θ, pi
(1)
s )− FWs(θ, pi(2)s ))
)
+ max
pi
AWs(θ˜
(1)
s , pi)−max
pi
AWs(θ˜
(2)
s , pi). (5)
The term minθ
(
(FWs(θ, pi
(1)
s )− FWs(θ, pi(2)s ))
)
is positive because FWs(θ, pi)
is strictly increasing in pi. On the other hand, the monotonicity of the FR
curve and pi(1)s > pi
(2)
s imply θ˜
(1)
s < θ˜
(2)
s . The second term maxpi AWs(θ˜
(1)
s , pi)−
maxpi AWs(θ˜
(2)
s , pi) is non-negative because maxpi AWs(θ, pi), which is the function
of θ, is decreasing it is a integration over applicants and each applicant takes
maximum over (i) pay its cost c to get reward ω(1− Fq,s(θ)) or (ii) get reward
ω(1− Fu,s(θ)), and both of the two options have decreasing reward in θ.
Theorem 1 states that the equilibria are ordered by pi: This matches our concep-
tion on the application process. The more effort the applicants pay, the more
applicants the firm accepts, and the better the equilibrium is.
3 Fairness Criteria and Their Results
Section 2.3 shows that a lack of fairness constraint discourages the individuals
of the unfavored group under an asymmetric equilibrium. A natural question
is that, whether or not we can impose some non-distriminatory constraint on
the firm’s decision-making to remove such asymmetric equilibria. This section
compares several constraints that are discussed in the literature.
The first constraint is the one that adopts the same threshold to the two
groups:
Definition 2 (Color blind (CB) policy) The firm decision is said to be color-
blind iff θ˜0 = θ˜1. The equilibria under CB are characterized by a set of quadraples
(θ˜0, θ˜1, pi0, pi1) that satisfies following constraints: (i) Equality (3) holds for
s = 0, 1. (ii) Moreover, letting θ˜ := θ˜0 = θ˜1, the following holds:
(λ0pi0 + λ1pi1) =
φ(θ˜)
r + φ(θ˜)
,
where φ(θ) = λ0fu,s=0(θ)+λ1fu,s=1(θ)λ0fq,s=0(θ)+λ1fq,s=1(θ) .
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In other words, under CB the firm considers an optimization of single θ˜ over a
single group that mixed the two groups of s = 0, 1. Contrary to the argument of
[1] (as discussed in Section 1), CB potentially yields an unfair treatment between
two groups when Fe,s(θ) varies largely among two groups s = 0, 1:
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium with pi0 6= pi1 under CB.
In the following, we show examples of the disparity in Proposition 2. Let N (µ, σ2)
be a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. Let I(A) be 1 if A holds
or 0 otherwise,
Example 1 (Insufficient identification) Let d = 1 and
Xs=0 ∼ N (I(e = q), 1)
Xs=1 ∼ N (I(e = q) + 10, 1) (6)
and λ0 ≈ 1. As the classifier cannot consider s explicitly, it utilizes the only
dimension as θ = X. Assume that vu, vq, and ω are such that there exists more
than two equilibria as shown in Figure 2 for group s = 0. Remember that the
equilibria under CB is determined by the interaction between the firm and a
mixture of two groups s = 0, 1. As the population of s = 1 approaches 0, one can
show that the θ˜ of any equilibrium is arbitrarily close to the one of the equilibria
for the majority s = 0, which has some capability of identifying e = u or q of
person in s = 0, and thus θ˜ is not very far from 0.5. In this case, most people of
s = 1 would be assigned to yˆ = 1 regardless of their efforts (which discourages
them), and thus pi1 is close to 0 whereas pi0 is not.
Another example is the case where predictive power of θ largely differs between
two
Example 2 (signal of different accuracy) Let X ∈ R2 and b0, b1 be the orthog-
onal bases of X.
X|s = 0 ∼ N (I(e = q)− 0.5, 1) b0
X|s = 1 ∼ N (I(e = q)− 0.5, 102) b1. (7)
In this case, a linear classifier can utilize a linear combination of the two basis
to create a signal θ: The first (resp. the second) basis is for identifying the effort
of people in s = 0 (resp. s = 1). For any threshold value of θ, such a signal is of
very different incentive c˜s(θ) between groups s = 0, 1. Due to the noisy signal,
θ gives very little information on whether a person of s = 1 exert an effort or
not. When an equilibrium exists, the very little of s = 1 would exert an effort,
whereas a certain portion of s = 0 would be incentivized to exert an effort.
The implication of the examples above is as follows: When the signal θ treats
the two group differently, as is shown in the case of credit risk prediction [7]
(Figure 4 therein), the accuracy of a classifier can vary among s, which will make
a mere application of CB fail.
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We next consider the constraint of the demographic parity, which is arguably
the most common notion of fairness in the context of fairness-aware machine
learning.
Definition 3 (demographic parity, DP) The firm decision is said satisfy demo-
graphic parity iff P[θ > θ˜0|s = 0] = P[θ > θ˜1|s = 1]. The equilibria under DP are
characterized by a set of quadraples (θ˜0, θ˜1, pi0, pi1) that satisfies following con-
straints: (i) Equality (3) holds for s = 0, 1. (ii) Moreover, letting θ˜ := θ˜0 = θ˜1,
the following holds:
(θ˜0, θ˜1) = max
(θ0,θ1)
FW(θ˜0, θ˜1, pi0, pi1),
s.t. pi0(1− Fq,s=0) + (1− pi0)(1− Fu,s=0)
= pi1(1− Fq,s=1) + (1− pi1)(1− Fu,s=1).
In other words, it equalizes the ratio of the people accepted among s = 0, 1.
However, as discussed in Coate and Loury [1], such a constraint does not remove
disparity:
Proposition 3 There exists an equilibrium with pi0 6= pi1 under the demographic
parity.
The formal construction of explicit example was shown in Coate and Loury [1]
(Section B therein). Although they show some example where θ is discrete, it
is not very difficult to empirically confirm that standard classifier can yields
equilibria of pi0 6= pi1 as we empirically show in Section 4. At a word, an
asymmetric equilibrium exists when (i) the ratio of minority λ1 is small, and (ii)
the classifier is very accurate (i.e., Fu,s(θ)− Fq,s(θ) is large). In such a case, the
firm “patronizes” the minority of not exerting efforts (i.e., small pi1) because it is
relatively cheaper to admit a small fraction of the unqualified minorities than
dismissing many qualified majority applicants. The equilibrium is discouraging
minorities as they have a little motivation for investing themselves when they
know they are accepted regardless of their efforts.
Recent work [7, 8] proposed alternative criteria of fairness called equalized
opportunity and equalized odds. Let FPs(θ˜) = P[θ > θ˜s|s, e = 0] and TPs(θ˜) =
P[θ > θ˜s|s, e = 1] be the false positive (FP) and the true positive (TP) rate of the
classifier, respectively. The equalized odds criterion requires θ to have the same
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (i.e., a curve comprised of (FP,
TP)) for both groups. When the data is biased, θ does not satisfy the equalize
odds criterion [15, 16, 17]. In our simulation in Section 4, the classifier trained
with a U.S. national survey dataset is biased towards the majority (Figure 3 (a)).
To address this issue, Hardt et al. [7] proposed a post-processing that derives
another classifier θ′ from the original signal θ. The following theorem states the
feasible region of FP and TP rates of the derived predictor.
Theorem 2 (feasible region of a derived predictor [7]) Consider a two-dimensional
convex region that is spanned by the (FP,TP)(θ)-curve and a line segment from
(0, 0) to (1, 1). The (FP,TP) of a derived predictor θ′ lies in the convex region.
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Figure 3: (a) The ROC curves of a predictor trained with the NLSY dataset.
Details of the dataset and the settings are described in Section 4. One can
confirm that the convexity of the ROC curve is equivalent to MLRP. In the
figure, the two ROC curves are fairly close to convex. (b)(c) The WR and AR
curves estimated from the NLSY dataset.
In other words, any θ′ of an ROC curve is available as long as it is under the
ROC curve of θ. The EO policy is formalized as follows:
Definition 4 (Equalized odds) The firm’s policy is said to be odds-equalized
when a (derived) predictor θ′ satisfies FPs=0(θ′) = FPs=1(θ′) and TPs=0(θ′) =
TPs=1(θ
′), and the assignment based on the derived signal θ′ is color-blind.
The following theorem states that the EO does not generate disparity: There
exists no asymmetric equilibrium under a derived predictor of EO.
Theorem 3 For any equilibrium under EO, pi0 = pi1 holds.
Proof 2 Let θ˜′ be the threshold at an equilibrium. From EO, c˜s(θ˜′) = ω(Fs,u(θ˜′)−
Fs,q(θ˜
′)) is identical for two groups s = 0, 1, and thus pis = G(c˜s(θ˜′)) is also
identical.
Note that Hardt et al. [7] also proposed a policy called equalized opportunity that
only requires the equality of TP. By definition, any predictor of the equalized
odds satisfies the equalized opportunity, but not vice versa. Unlike the equalized
odds, the equalized opportunity can result in pi0 6= pi1.
4 Simulation
To assess the social welfare and disparity on the equilibrium of the LF, CB, DP,
and EO policies, we conducted numerical simulations.
Dataset and Settings: We used the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY97) dataset retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/nls/ that involves
survey results by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics that is intended to gather
information on the labor market activities and other life events of several groups.
We model a virtual company’s hiring decision assuming that the company does
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not have access to the applicants’ academic scores. We set y to be whether
each person’s GPA is ≥ 3.0 or not. Sensitive attribute s is the race of the
person (s = 0: white, s = 1: black or African American). We have total 2,028
(resp. 782) people of s = 0 (resp. s = 1). and X to be demographic features
comprised of their school records, attitude towards life (voluntary and anti-moral
activities of themselves and their peers), and geographical information during
1997 (corresponding to their late teenage). The reward vq (resp. vu) are chosen
to be 53097−46640 (resp. 46640−40604) dollars, which is the gap of the average
income in 2015 (corresponding to their early thirties) between the people of GPA
≥ 3.0 (resp. < 3.0) from all people: If a job market is in perfect competition,
the wage is equivalent to the productivity of the workers that a company hires,
and hiring a worker yields reward that is a gap between his or her productivity
and the average wage. ω are chosen to be 46640− 40604 dollars, which models
the gap between the salary of the firm and the minimum wage they would be
able to obtain with minimal effort. The cost distribution is chosen to be uniform
distribution from 0 to maxs,θ ω(Fu,s(θ) − Fq,s(θ)), as the applicants of a cost
above this value never exert effort. Note that our results are not very sensitive
to these settings as long as multiple equilibria exist. We used the RidgeCV
classifier of the scikit-learn library [20] to yield θ. The two thirds of the people
are used to train the classifier, and the following results are tested by using the
rest of them.
Results: From the ROC curve is shown in Figure 3 (a) one can see that the
accuracy of the classifier varies among two groups: The GPA of the majority
s = 0 is more predictable than the minority. This might come from the fact that
a classifier minimizes the cumulative empirical loss, and as a result it tends to
fit to the majority. Figure 3 (b)(c) shows the best response of the applicants
and the firm under LF. Generally, equilibrium values of pi0 is larger than that of
pi1. As a result, the social welfare per person in s = 0 is usually larger than that
of s = 1. Note that, in estimating the FR curve, we applied some averaging to
make fe,s(θ) stable.
Based on the Fe,s(θ) and fe,s(θ) in Figure 3, we conducted simulation to
confirm the social welfare (SW) and disparity measured by |pi0 − pi1| (Table 1).
In finding equilibria, we discretized θ and sought where the best response curves
intersected. One can see that (i) The result of CB and DP are more or less the
Table 1: Results of the policies. The social welfare (SW), the welfare of the
firm (FW), and disparity |pi0 − pi1| of the best equilibrium are shown. We set
λ0 = 2028/(2028 + 782).
policy LF CB DP EO
Disparity 9.8% 8.8% 12.8% 0%
SW 2338.6 2304.7 2411.2 1412.2
RW 1614.3 1596.9 1564.8 1004.3
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same as the one of LF: They did not remove disparity. DP even increases the
disparity. Unlike these policies, EO is disparity-free. (ii) EO, which is the only
policy that does not yield disparity, results in the smallest SW. This result is
not very surprising because EO reduces the predictive power of the classifier for
s = 0 to match up with that for s = 1, which we may consider as a price of
achieving incentive-level equality. Somewhat surprisingly, DP slightly increases
SW, about which we discuss in Appendix A.
5 Conclusion
We have studied a game between many applicants and a firm, which models
human-related decision-making scenes such as university admission, hiring, and
credit risk assessments. Our framework that ties two lines of work in the
theoretical labor economics and the machine learning provides a method to
compare existing (or future) non-discriminatory policies in terms of their social
welfare and disparity. The framework is rather simple, and many extensions can
be considered (e.g., making the investment e continuous value). Although we
show that EO is the only available policy that does not yield disparity, it tends
to reduce social welfare. Interesting directions of possible future work include
a proposal of policy that balances the social welfare and disparity: A policy
with minimal or no loss of social welfare that has a small disparity is desirable.
Another possible line of future work lies in evaluating policies in online settings,
such as multi-armed bandits [21].
12
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Appendix of “Comparing Fairness Criteria Based on
Social Outcome”
A Does Non-discriminatory Policies Decrease So-
cial Welfare?
We first explain the reason why DP sometimes increases the social welfare.
In Figure 2 of the main paper, θ˜(1)s lies in the regions where the AR curve is
increasing. Intuitively, this means that around θ˜(1)s making the requirement
stricter encourages the applicants to invest in skills. Compared to LF, under DP
the employer imposes a milder threshold on the disadvantaged group and stricter
threshold on the advantaged group. Given the advantaged group is in θ(1)s ,
adopting DP encourages their investment, which can result in the improvement
in the overall productivity of the group. When λ1 is very small, this effect
offsets the loss of the efficiency due to hiring the minorities of less productivity,
which sometimes result in an improvement of SW. As to the equalized odds,
there can be some corner-case examples such that TPs=0(θ′) > TPs=1(θ′) and
SW0 < SW1 depending on the shapes of the FR and AR curves: In such a case,
EO increases the social welfare. In summary, when λ1 is small, DP sometimes
improves SW as we saw in our experiment (Table 1). EO can increase SW in
some corner-case, but we think such a case is very unusual.
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